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Much like the evolution of man, the relationship that humans hold with animals has also 
evolved over time. However, as this relationship constantly develops, it is crucial that the 
importance of animal welfare does not fade into the background. Humans rely on animals on a 
daily basis, regardless of whether this relationship is for commercial purposes or 
companionship, an animal’s welfare should always be preserved. As with all aspects of society, 
protection resides within the law, however, within the UK, such protection requires 
improvement. This need for improvement is evident due to the UK’s recent demotion from 
Category A to Category B in the Animal Protection Index, an index that is collated to assess 
the protection of animals on a global scale.1 The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate the 
current protections animals have within the legal system, giving specific reference to the 
enforcement of sentencing powers available to courts for animal related offences.  
 
To fully assess this lack of protection and the need for change, three main areas will be 
considered. Firstly, in Chapter 1 the philosophy behind animal rights and their welfare will be 
discussed, giving specific reference to the Citizenship theory. This will initiate thought around 
this area and allow for clarity on why animals are deserving of further protection within the 
law.  
 
Secondly, an outline and analysis of the current law and sanctions available within the UK will 
be provided. This critique will not just be limited to that of custodial sentencing, but also the 
lack of enforceability surrounding other sentencing measures such as disqualification. 
Furthermore, there will be focus on how it is in the public interest to increase animal protection. 
This discussion will draw reference to numerous points such as the correlation between animal 
and human violence and how these offences intertwine within the legal system. This, coupled 
with the philosophy discussion, will offer not just why animals are deserving of protection but 
how such protection may also benefit humans.  
 
Finally, after establishing a need for change, an assessment of animal welfare measures within 
international legal systems will be provided. This will allow for suggestions to be made as to 
how the UK system could be reformed and improved to tackle the issues discussed. 
 
1 Animal Protection Index, ‘United Kingdom’ (Animal Protection Index, 10 March 2020) < 
https://api.worldanimalprotection.org/country/united-kingdom > accessed 4 May 2020 
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Comparisons of the UK measures will be made to both European, Australian and United States’ 
legal systems. The propositions put forward will range from a simple increase in sentencing, 
to further measures such as the introduction of an animal abuse register and upward departures 



































Philosophy and the theories behind it play a crucial part in critiquing and influencing various 
aspects of human society. Although the discussions within this area may not have a direct link 
to legal innovation, inferences from these discussions put forward some interesting thoughts to 
consider. Whether these theories can be used to improve the whole of the English legal system, 
or just specific areas, is yet to be established. However, for the purposes of this chapter, and 
the text as a whole, only theories regarding animal welfare will be discussed. 
 
In order to understand the need for reform within the legal system, readers must understand the 
nature behind animals and their sentience on this planet. Therefore, a brief introduction to the 
history of animal welfare will be provided together with how the current theories have been 
furthered in recent years, to evoke a change in society’s outlook. This chronological 
development will serve as a backbone of thought to allow readers to fully consider the proposed 
changes presented. 
 
The History of Animal Welfare 
 
The discussion surrounding animal welfare and their entitlement to a life without suffering is 
not a new debate, however, it is a debate that has not been furthered substantially in the past 
two centuries, with evidence of such laboured progression being displayed in England’s legal 
and political history. 
 
Debates surrounding this area were first sparked in 1800 by political and legal pioneers such  
as William Pulteney, who introduced the first Bill proposing the protection of animals, 
specifically bulls. The Bill was brought on 2nd April 1800 to prevent a sport known as 
bullbaiting, in which specially bred dogs would be set upon bulls for human entertainment.2 
The Bill failed by a close margin of 43 votes to 41.3 A close margin that comes with heightened 
frustration when compared with other Bills passed by parliament in the same year, such as a 
 
2 Great Britain House of Commons, Journal of the House of Commons (vol.55, 1799-1800) 362 
3 Hilda Kean, Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800 (Reaktion Books Ltd 1988) 31 
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Bill that was designed to regulate the price of bread.4 Although Mr Pulteney’s actions did not 
result in the Bill being passed, his actions sparked inspiration for future politicians to further 
the argument to newfound levels. Politicians such as Lord Thomas Erskine, who was the first 
member of Parliament to suggest the idea that animals should be deserving of not just 
protection, but rights, in 1809. This suggestion, however, alongside Mr Pulteney’s Bill, was 
quite quickly rejected in the House of Commons after passing a second reading in the House 
of Lords.5  
 
It was not until 7th June 1822 that the first legislation surrounding the protection of animals was 
finally passed. This legislation was known as Martin’s Act, in honour of the MP of Galway 
who promoted the Bill, Richard Martin. With the introduction of this Act, for the first time in 
English legal history, it was an offence to “beat, abuse, or ill-treat any horse, mare, gelding, 
mule, ass, ox, cow, heifer, steer, sheep or other cattle”.6 A breach of such an offence was 
punishable by both a fine and imprisonment.7 Although this legislation explicitly refers to 
which animals are worthy of protection, mainly those which were victim of publicly-displayed 
cruelty at that time, the introduction of this Act led to even further development surrounding 
animal welfare in England and Wales. 
 
Two years after the introduction of Martin’s Act, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (SPCA) was established in 1824, the first society of its kind in Britain.8 Although the 
introduction of such a society can be seen as a landmark in the history of animal welfare, the 
Society’s outlooks were very much based on the provisions set out in the Martin’s Act. 
Therefore, similar to the law at the time, protection was not afforded to animals of all sorts. 
The early years of the SPCA were spent preventing public displays of animal cruelty, such as 
the abuse of carriage horses, rather than pushing for the protection to be expanded to private 
dwellings and the animals residing in these i.e. domesticated pets.9  
 
The SPCA was then reformed in 1840, providing us with what is now the most established 
society for animal welfare in Britain, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
 
4 Ibid 32 
5 Ibid 33 
6 Ibid 34 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 35 
9 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis (Oxford University Press 2011) 1 
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Animals (RSPCA).10 However, even with the introduction of this newly-branded society, the 
scope of animals that were worthy of protection remained the same. The RSPCA, for years to 
come, enforced a strange form of ‘see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’ in an attempt to 
prevent humans from witnessing acts of animal abuse in public, rather than preventing the 
abuse of animals altogether.11 It wasn’t until the early 1900s that this focus was changed and 
the RSPCA moved away from protection of only farm animals, to focus on the protection of 
both domesticated and wild animals. However, this movement was more of a mirroring of the 
previous movement, as although wild and domesticated animals were now at the forefront of 
their work, the protection of farm animals had taken a retrograde step, damaging the public 
awareness of such issues and their importance. 
 
This has thankfully come to an end in the past few decades with the RSPCA’s activities, once 
again, returning to the farming industry, with this prevalence, possibly, being instigated by the 
rise of intensive farming practices that occurred post World War II in an attempt to spike food 
production around the UK.12 
 
Importantly, they have also expanded their focus on other issues such as the use of animals in 
lab testing and experiments, hunting, the use of animals in circuses and the treatment of animals 
in zoos. It is encouraging to note that the RSPCA has managed to incorporate all these 
additional areas without causing detriment to the protection they have continued to provide for 
domesticated and wild animals, therefore, proving themselves as the most essential society in 
the history of animal welfare and its development within England over the past two centuries13. 
 
The essential work that the RSPCA undertake in their fight against animal cruelty is aided by 
current legislative measures in place within the UK. Although previous discussion has outlined 
the history of legal innovation, the statutes and Bills mentioned prior are not currently 
circulating today. Instead, the RSPCA base the majority of their prosecutions on offences under 
the Animal Welfare Act 2006 and rely on the robustness of this Act to ensure the correct 
sanctions are placed on those individuals who breach these provisions. These sanctions, as will 
 
10 Hilda Kean, Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800 (Reaktion Books Ltd 1988) 35 
11 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (First Published 1990, Pimlico 1995) 218 
12 Abigail Woods, ‘From Cruelty to Welfare: The Emergence of Farm Animal Welfare in Britain, 1964-1971’ 
[2012] 36:1 Endeavour 14, 17 
13 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (First Published 1990, Pimlico 1995)  219 
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be discussed in subsequent chapters, are, unfortunately, not as robust as they could be and are, 
therefore, leaving vulnerable animals in danger of abuse. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the basic relationship that humans hold with animals is partially 
lacking. Whether this be the use of animals in agriculture or the testing on animals for medical 
advances, animals are continually being abused for the ‘benefit’ of human gain. This abusive 
relationship has been described by some theorists as an “external Treblinka” and unfortunately, 
a relationship that is showing no signs of changing.14 
 
 
Why Animal Suffering Matters 
 
Firstly, it is important to clarify what is meant by the term suffering. This term has many 
definitions that may be relevant, however, the most common of these is the association of 
physical pain with suffering. As much as physical pain can go hand in hand with suffering, it 
must be made clear that suffering can exist in many different forms, not just that of a physical 
nature.15 The suffering an animal may endure as a result of stimuli could amount to mental 
suffering such as anxiety, stress and terror, rather than the physical feeling of pain.16 Therefore, 
suffering can broadly be defined as “harm that an animal experiences characterised as a 
deficiency in (or negative aspect of) that animal’s well-being.”17  
 
In modern society it is generally believed that most humans would refrain from imposing or 
witnessing such suffering on another human, whether the suffering was of a mental or physical 
nature.18 However, being in a position to extend the prevention of suffering to animals will 
only be possible once humans are educated on the similarities they have, especially in infancy, 
with their animal counterparts.19  
 
It is unfortunate that animal suffering, especially in Western society, is generally accepted as a 
result of human arrogance or selfishness. This acceptance is demonstrated daily throughout the 
global farming industry. Here, animals are viewed as part of the production line, another 
 
14 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis (Oxford University Press 2011) 2 
15 Animal Welfare Act 2006, s 62 
16 Andrew Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters (Oxford University Press 2009) 10 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid 1 
19 Ibid 4 
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essential cog in the process of providing humans with food. Simply viewing animals as ‘things’ 
rather than living beings, as coined by Gary Francione, is known a ‘moral schizophrenia’.20 
An ideal that has been enshrined in human nature, dating as far back as the seventeenth century 
where René Descartes “likened animals to “automatons, or moving machines”.21  
 
As mentioned though, the sad truth is, this archaic view is still prominent today, with much of 
this ‘moral schizophrenia’, similar to the one outlined above, being justified by fallacious 
arguments and justifications. Whether it be the proposition that we “need” meat to survive in 
response to the suggestion of a plant-based diet, or the argument that animals simply aren’t as 
“aware” as humans are to their surroundings. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is the latter 
of these propositions which needs clarified in order to reinforce the argument that animal 
suffering really does matter.  
 
The awareness animals have of their surroundings, from a philosophical perspective anyway, 
relates more to an animal’s ability to feel, rather than their instinctive ability to hunt prey or 
detect predators. This is why it is more commonly put forward that animals lack the ‘sentience’ 
that humans do. Despite this label, even in the field, this definition of ‘sentience’ is contested 
and therefore carries with it some ambiguity. Some dictionaries define it as “sense perception”, 
however, the majority of philosophers and animal advocates use the term to “denote the 
capacity for suffering… pain and pleasure”.22 Therefore, in other words, the quality of being 
able to experience feelings. It is true that humans are social animals and therefore experience 
feelings and concepts that other animals may never even consider within their lifetime, such as 
“the angst relating to whether life is worth living or the concept of death at all”.23 However, 
importantly, these feelings are only prevalent in adult humans and are developed later in life. 
Therefore, starving a being of the protection against suffering, purely because they cannot 
experience these feelings seems somewhat perverse. It may not just be animals that cannot 
experience these feelings of sentience; surely infant humans and individuals with specific 
disabilities lack this function also. Yet it would be inconceivable to accept such suffering to 
 
20 Gary L Francione, ‘Animals – Property or Persons?’ in Cass R Sunstein and Martha C Nussbaum (eds), 
Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (OUP 2004) 108 
21 Ibid 110 
22 Andrew Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters (Oxford University Press 2009) 47 
23 Ibid 31 
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these groups. This distinction is known, and discussed further below, as the “argument from 
marginal cases” and is a well-renowned contradiction to the “sentience” theory above.24 
 
Andrew Linzey, a leader in the animal rights movement, put forward a test case relating to this 
very point. He imagined a scenario in which you were staying at your old friends’ house; an 
older, wiser philosopher than yourself. Throughout the night you were woken by the sounds of 
screaming and consequently went to investigate the origin of this noise. Upon investigation 
you found your friend beating his young infant child, of no more than one year old. Instead of 
forcibly protesting against the matter, you instead spark a debate with your friend, as he is a 
philosopher himself. You ask for the reasoning behind such action and demonstrate your 
objection to such a breach of morality. However, your friend justifies his actions as him having 
more superior interests than his infant son and how his son lacks the intelligence and awareness 
to experience the amount of suffering that an adult can including a lack of angst surrounding 
the concept of death. Your friend goes on to state further that with the absence of language, 
there is no way of determining whether the groans and cries heard are in fact from suffering or 
just a “gurgling of his stomach”.25 Furthermore, and to finalise, your friend states that a living 
being without an adult level of human intelligence and responsibility cannot have moral rights, 
and therefore, his actions are just. 26 
 
Although this scenario is perhaps quite extreme, it is once again clear that any normal human 
would object to such treatment of another human, especially an infant. However, on further 
inspection, the similarities of such a case and the way humans treat animals is uncanny. Yes, it 
is true that animals lack the capability to communicate with our created languages and they 
obviously have nowhere near as much social responsibility as we do as adults. However, they 
are not absent of these factors altogether. They too have ways in which they communicate, and 
responsibilities of their own, similar to the way in which infant humans do.27 It is arguable, in 
fact, that animals bear greater responsibilities than that of a human infant, but this lack of 
responsibility on the side of the infant does not void its entitlement to rights. It is, therefore, 
remarkably clear why animal suffering matters. Animal suffering matters, just as infant and 
 
24 Elizabeth Anderson, ‘Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life’ in Cass R Sunstein and Martha C 
Nussbaum (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (OUP 2004) 277, 280 
25 Andrew Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters (Oxford University Press 2009) 31 
26 Ibid 30, 31 
27 Richard L Jr Cupp, ‘Litigating Nonhuman Animal Legal Personhood’ (2018) 50 Tex Tech L Rev 573, 585 
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vulnerable humans’ suffering matters, and drawing a distinction between the two is flawed. All 
are living creatures inhabiting the same environment, each striving for the same goal, survival.  
 
Common Theories and Why They are Failing 
 
Regardless of the abusive relationship that humans hold with animals, theorists are constantly 
striving to change society’s outlook on animals for the better, in their quest for a fairer world 
for animals. It is safe to say that these theories, that have been created, innovated, and expanded 
throughout the centuries, have made greater advances than the changes observed in England’s 
legal or political systems. However, a theory is worth nothing without proper implementation. 
A theory is properly executed when it evokes a change in society’s outlook on a wider scale 
than what is being observed in modern times.  
 
There are many theories currently in circulation, but this chapter will concentrate on the most 
common in use and offer analyses of why these theories are failing, shedding light on the 
changes required, to fully expand the protection of animals to a new level. The majority of 
humans will not relate their views to a particular ‘theory’ but would more commonly refer to 
their views as ‘morals’, or in this case ‘moral frameworks’. As one could imagine, there are 
endless possibilities when trying to compile various individuals’ morals into one generic 
formula. However, it is safe, for the purposes of animal welfare debates, to assume there are 
three ‘basic moral frameworks’ that are observed in modern society, with each of these 
frameworks potentially bearing similarities to wider used philosophical theories.28 
 
The first of these frameworks is a concept referred to as the ‘welfarist’ approach. This is the 
framework that is most widely observed or associated with most members of society. This 
framework acknowledges that the majority of humans accept that animal welfare matters, but 
it does not rank highly on their agenda.29 Therefore, they believe that, from a moral perspective, 
human beings stand above animals in the hierarchy. This belief, in philosophy, is known as 
speciesism – a “prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interest of members of one’s own 
species and against those of members of other species”.30 
 
 
28 Ibid 3 
29 Ibid 
30 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (First Published 1990, Pimlico 1995) 6 
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The second of the proposed frameworks is known as the ‘ecological’ approach. This approach, 
in general, provides more protection to animals than would be observed under a ‘welfarist’ 
approach. The ‘ecological’ approach focuses on the health of ecosystems as a whole, rather 
than the protection of individual animals or species themselves. It does, therefore, protect 
animals from a wide range of human practices that have a negative impact on both animals and 
their ecosystems. Such protections range from the prevention of habitat destruction to limiting 
the polluting and carbon-generating effects of, for example, factory farming. Besides this 
broader application, the approach does not serve as blanket protection for animals as a whole. 
This is due to situations that may occur that would involve the killing of animals to preserve 
the health of the ecosystem as a whole, such as: sustainable hunting, livestock farming or the 
culling of invasive or overpopulated species.31 
 
The final of the proposed frameworks is known as the ‘basic rights’ approach or animal rights 
theory (ART). This is the approach that the majority of animal welfare advocates and societies 
adopt in the fight for improving the standards humans impose on animals. The theory revolves 
around the idea that animals, like humans, should be seen as possessing certain rights under 
law. Rights that are referred to as inviolable, in the sense that they should never be broken, 
infringed or dishonoured. These rights could be observed as an extension of the statutory 
human rights enshrined in law, with such an extension contributing to the overall concept of 
moral equality.32 It is the ART’s intentions that animals will one day benefit from the inviolable 
rights available to humans. These rights include, but are not exhaustive to, the right to life, “the 
right not to be tortured, imprisoned, subjected to medical experimentation, forcibly separated 
from their families or culled”.33 It is the concept that these rights should be mutually exclusive 
for both animals and humans and not just limited to the protection of humans under statute. It 
is this theory that has been relied upon by animal welfare societies and advocates for decades, 
however, no real change has been observed in relation to animals’ protection. This being said, 
there are some potential reasons for this failure. 
 
One of the reasons for ART failing is as a result of individuals holding a different perspective 
to how animals should be treated. For example, an individual who is party to the major moral 
approach outlined above (the ‘welfarist’ approach) is unlikely to agree with the suggestions put 
 
31 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis (Oxford University Press 2011) 3 




forward by a supporter of ART. But why is it seemingly the case that the majority of society 
are a supporter of this ‘welfarist’ approach and not ART?  
 
The answer to this question once again falls to the philosophy of speciesism and the 
development of this philosophy in Western culture. Western culture has, for centuries, operated 
on the premise that animals are lower than humans on some ‘cosmic moral hierarchy’.34 It is 
this operation that has been engrained into humans from the lowest of ages, even if such 
manipulation is done so unconsciously. This hierarchy is especially prevalent within the 
agricultural industry; however, such hierarchy could be extended to the domestication of 
household pets or the dominion over wild animals also.  
 
Relating specifically to the agricultural industry, this manipulation relates to the tainted picture 
presented to children from an early age surrounding the welfare and treatment of animals in 
agriculture. Whether this be the stuffed animals they are given as gifts in the appearance of 
bears or lions rather than that of pigs or cows, or the books they are read before bed by their 
parents. Books such as ‘Farm Animals’ which presents a child with the construed image that 
farm animals are happily surrounded by their young without a cage, shed or stall in sight and 
that all pigs have to do is “enjoy a good meal, then roll in the mud and let out a good squeal”.35 
Further to this, other books which portray a similar message show agricultural animals 
benefiting from “rural simplicity” and that animals run freely with their young in orchards and 
fields. It is no surprise, therefore, that with this image children develop the concept of 
speciesism in later life. That they develop the belief that animals “must” die to provide for 
humans, as they have lived a happy and suffering-free life up until that exact point.36 An ideal 
that consequently extends to the dominance over all animals, regardless of their species or 
origin. 
 
It is important to note that society is not purely reliant on a ‘welfarist’ approach due to 
speciesism, but their direction may be reinforced by the failings observed with ART itself. The 
societies and individuals that enforce ART mainly focus on negative rights such as the right 
not to be owned, confined, tortured, or separated from one’s family, rather than the duties owed 
 
34 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis (Oxford University Press 2011) 5 




to animals.37 Although these are rights that animals should benefit from, providing society with 
relational duties they must adhere to, would allow for the development of respect between 
humans and animals. These relational duties would relate to a human’s obligation to respects 
animals’ habitats, their obligation to rescue animals who are unintentionally harmed by human 
activities or their obligation to care for the animals who, either by domestication or another 
way, have become dependent on them.38 The enforcement of these relational duties and the 
development of respect thereof will in turn aid the protection of animals against the negative 
rights mentioned above.    
 
Without a change of direction on the enforcement of these duties, or a change of the theory 
altogether, society will remain trapped in their current ways, with no further developments 
occurring as a result of this. However, it appears that one theory regarding this matter is being 
developed. A theory with the potential for a real change in society’s outlook, this theory is the 
theory of ‘citizenship’. 
 
New Directions: Citizenship 
 
The theory of citizenship has been developed in acknowledgement of the potentially defective 
theories available currently, with the intention of providing a new moral framework. This 
framework works on connecting the treatment of animals to the fundamental principles of 
democratic justice and human rights.39 The theory not only draws reference to these principles, 
but it does so by acknowledging the complicated relationship humans hold with their animal 
counterparts. Co-existence is required to further the development of animal protection 
worldwide and this theory could act as an underlying framework for this development. 
 
The theory, quite obviously, focusses on the idea that animals should be issued with citizenship 
of some sort, depending on their status in society.  The application of this theory to animals is 
logical because it is the same system that is afforded to humans from various countries around 
the world. Humans are residents to their own distinct societies and countries, to which they are 
deemed citizens of. Then you have co-citizens and visitors to specific countries who are 
afforded these titles as a result of their residence. It is the current stance, in human society, that 
citizens of a country are afforded more rights in general than that of co-citizens or visitors to 
 
37 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis (Oxford University Press 2011) 6 
38 Ibid  
39 Ibid 3 
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that specific country. However, all parties benefit from fundamental rights that cannot be 
breached, regardless of title or status. Citizenship theory suggests that this malleable approach 
to rights should not only be imposed on humans, but animals also.40 
 
Applying this theory, animals which would be afforded full citizenship, similar to those humans 
who are nationals to their country, would be animals that have been domesticated by or for the 
use of humans. This would be the most just and moral option because their domestication is a 
product of selective breeding over generations by humans, similar to the human creation of 
borders and nations centuries ago.41 With these animals being essentially forced into their 
living by humans as their ‘masters’, they should be provided with the relevant protection in 
light of this. The protection of those we bring into the world is an ongoing responsibility and 
is one that cannot be derogated from if and when we please. Parents, who bring their child into 
the world, do so for life. This innate social responsibility should be extended to the animals we 
bring into our lives also, as they are dependent on our care and nurture on the same level as an 
infant. Parental neglection of a child would be frowned upon in society and so should that of 
an animal companion. 
 
Moving on from the idea of full citizenship, there are a minority of individuals who reside in 
their chosen country and are subject to that country’s governance, but who are not afforded 
citizenship. This would relate to what is known as ‘denizens’, which is normally the term used 
to refer to migrant workers or refugees of a country.42 Similar to the human equivalent, animals 
that bear the same characteristics of these minorities should be afforded a similar level of rights. 
These rights would be protected under the fundamental rights but would not include the 
granting of all the rights observed by full citizens, such as the right to vote. Animals in this 
category would relate to opportunistic animals such as foxes, rats and pigeons (or any other 
scavenging animal relevant).43 Finally, under the theory, a third level of rights would be 
afforded to animals which, from a human analogy, reside in different countries or colonies. 
This is particularly relevant to wild animals who reside in their own territory but are still 
vulnerable to human invasion and colonisation such as deer, badgers, and wild rabbits.44 
 
 
40 Ibid 13 
41 Ibid 14 
42 Ibid 13 




With the other theories available for the fight against animal cruelty, such as the ‘welfarist’ 
approach and the ART theory falling short of the protection required, the Citizenship theory 
provides a new, more formatted structure. After all, although it may sound extreme, the ideas 
behind Citizenship theory have proved essential in combatting the worst forms of austerity 
humankind has ever seen.  
 
Although racism and the horrors that run alongside it are not totally eradicated in modern 
society, the granting of citizenship has aided the fight against racism around the world. In the 
United States Constitution, the 14th Amendment allows for “all persons born or naturalized in 
the United States… [to be] citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside”.45 
This ratification of this amendment in 1868 allowed for African-Americans to be “emancipated 
from slavery, [representing] a turning point in the country’s history”.46 Therefore, the granting 
of citizenship provided rights to these individuals, such as the 15th Amendment’s right to vote.47 
This application of what is essentially the backbone of the Citizenship theory shows how 
change can be successfully achieved. This is not just down to the success imposing citizenship 
has had in the past, but the familiarity humans have with imposing such measures. Of course, 
it may seem abnormal to provide animals with rights now, however, it is abnormality that 
inspires change and change is what is needed. 
 
However, even with this need for change, the Citizenship theory is not free of criticism. Firstly, 
it is suggested issues lie within the structure of the theory itself. It has been argued by academics 
that the categorisation of different animals and what rights they hold as a result of this could 
“deny outsiders their just entitlements, and [could] unfairly privilege the rights of insiders.”48 
With the current structure of the theory, domesticated animals would be deemed as ‘citizens’, 
therefore, affording them more rights than that of opportunistic animals or ‘denizens’. 
Therefore, although the theory may work in practice by improving the overall welfare of the 
animals we commonly interact with, it may struggle to provide blanket protection to all animals 
of all categories. It is this potential limit on protection that has been raised as challenge to the 
theory. 
 
45 The Constitution of the United States of America 1789, Amend. XIV 
46 Dennis Parker, ‘The 14th Amendment Was Intended to Achieve Racial Justice – And We Must Keep It That 
Way’ (American Civil Liberties Union, 9 July 2018) < https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/race-and-
inequality-education/14th-amendment-was-intended-achieve-racial-justice > accessed 1 April 2020 
47 The Constitution of the United States of America 1789, Amend. XV 
48 Alasdair Cochrane, ‘Cosmozoopolis: The Case Against Group-Differentiated Animal Rights’ (University of 




Secondly, a further challenge relates to the political nature of the theory, more specifically the 
ability of an animal to democratically vote. These arguments, however, are fuelled by a 
misunderstanding of the term citizenship. Individuals must be made aware that citizenship 
relates to the allocation of “individuals to territories [and] to allocate membership in sovereign 
peoples” (as discussed above).49 It is not determined by a beings ability to politically vote, as, 
once again, infants are deemed as citizens but lack the capability to democratically vote.50 
Therefore, restricting the definition of citizenship to this ability alone would exclude “large 
numbers of humans from citizenship rights” also.51 However, with this criticism in mind, it 
shows clarification is needed to the role in which imposing Citizenship theory on animals will 
have on their legal protection. 
 
Citizenship and Legal Protection 
 
For the purpose of this theory and its implication, it must be stressed, once again, that activists 
are not lobbying for animals to have rights that are fully equal to that of humans, such as a dog 
being given the right to vote or freedom of speech, as these rights would not be cohesive with 
the animals’ characteristics. They are simply striving for transferable rights to be imposed on 
animals of all sorts, with these rights being variant of their specific title or residence in society.  
 
The introduction of this style system would innovate the legal protection afforded to animals. 
Legal protection, similar to that of the Human Rights Act 1998, that would allow for 
fundamental rights to be imposed on animals. In application of this protection, domesticated 
animals would be afforded more rights, as citizens, than that of foxes and pigeons, as denizens. 
The balance of these rights, based on an animal’s status would have to be clarified, however, 
the introduction of strict statutory inviolable rights will automatically increase public 
awareness to the issues observed in modern society. This combination of statutory control and 
public awareness could be the key to resolving the issues currently observed in our country and 
act as a template for reform for many more countries around the world.  
 
49 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis (Oxford University Press 2011) 61 




Chapter 2: UK Law on Animal Cruelty and the 




Improvement of welfare standards, and protection as a whole, may well be enforced by the 
protective organisations that work tirelessly in pursuit of their aims. However, these are 
stretched to their limits, both with regards to investigation and the aftercare available to affected 
animals. In 2018, the RSPCA was responsible for the rescue of 102,900 animals and the 
investigation of 130,700 complaints of cruelty from the public, all of which were investigated 
by a limited number of approximately 350 inspectorate officers.52 These figures show the 
struggle these officers face daily. Therefore, the real protection must come from reinforcement 
and development of the law. Improving the law relating to animal welfare will allow for the 
legal system to work in tandem with the protective organisations that currently lead the fight 
against animal cruelty. 
 
Outline of the UK Law 
 
There are numerous statutes that cover various aspects of animal welfare, ranging from the 
overall welfare of animals in the United Kingdom, to more niche practices and regulated areas 
such as the use of animals in scientific procedures.53 For the purpose of this dissertation, the 
statute relating to the overall protection of animals will be analysed: the Animal Welfare Act 
2006.54  
 
The AWA 2006 is a relatively robust Act that aims at providing protection that covers all 
possible aspects of animal cruelty. In fact, upon introduction, the AWA 2006 was described as 
“the most significant animal welfare legislation for nearly a century”.55 This was because it 
replaced the Protection of Animals Act 1911, a statute that “merely protected [animals] by the 
coincidence of a collection of outdated laws written primarily to protect people’s property”.56 
 
52 Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), ‘Trustees’ Report and Accounts’ (2018) < 
https://www.rspca.org.uk/documents/1494939/7712578/RSPCA+Trustees+Report+and+Accounts+2018+%28P
DF+1.07MB%29.pdf/3d1ed803-2485-9300-6058-1108409f014a?t=1560511878538 > accessed 29 January 2020 
53 Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986  
54 Henceforth referred to as ‘AWA 2006’ 




The existence of this new legislation ensured that this was no longer the case. The earlier 
sections (s.1 – s.3 AWA 2006) set out the animals and species in which the Act applies, 
alongside other important provisions. Animals covered are listed as any ‘vertebrates other than 
man’, giving specific reference to the Act not including invertebrates or embryonic/foetal 
animals. However, this restriction is only limited so far as the national authority wish not to 
extend such protection.57 The Act then specifies that, although it applies to all vertebrates other 
than man, not all animals that fall under this category shall be regarded as ‘protected animals’. 
The Act states that vertebrates that are deemed as protected must be; “of a kind commonly 
domesticated in the British Islands, … under the control of man whether on a permanent or 
temporary basis, OR … not living in a wild state”.58 The earlier sections also define who will 
be deemed responsible for the animals that fall under the Act. It states that a person will be 
deemed responsible for an animal if they are: in charge of it, the owner of it, or responsible for 
it on a permanent or temporary basis.59 Furthermore, if an individual under the age of 16 is 
responsible for the care and control of an animal, and breaches of the Act occur, the person in 
charge of the minor responsible for such a breach would be deemed as responsible for the 
animal also. 60 
 
After setting out who and what is covered by the Act, the subsequent sections (s.4 – s.8 AWA 
2006) determine what acts would constitute an offence. These sections aim to mainly prevent 
harm coming to a ‘protected animal’ and range from the prevention of unnecessary suffering 
to the prevention of mutilation, administration of poison and fighting. Key points related to the 
prevention of suffering is that an individual can be liable for both an act and an omission that 
leads to the suffering of a protected animal. However, the individual would have to have been 
aware that their act or omission would have (or likely to have) caused suffering. Furthermore, 
the suffering experienced would have to have been unnecessary.61 Suffering would be deemed 
unnecessary if the suffering could reasonably have been avoided or reduced. On the other hand, 
suffering would be deemed necessary if it were done so for a legitimate purpose, such as: the 
purpose of benefiting the animal, or the purpose of protecting a person, property, or another 
animal.62  
 
57 Animal Welfare Act 2006, s 1 
58 Ibid s 2  
59 Ibid s 3 
60 Ibid s 3 (4) 
61 Ibid s 4 (1) 




It must be noted, however, that the Act does not focus all of its attention on physical acts of 
violence against animals. Sections 9 – 12 (s.9 – s.12) relate to the promotion of welfare for 
animals. These focus on the duties imposed on the person responsible for the protected animals. 
These relate to the responsible person being under a duty to provide a suitable environment and 
diet for the protected animal, alongside considering the animals’ needs to: exhibit normal 
behaviour patterns, be housed with (or apart from) animals and its protection from pain, 
suffering, injury and disease.63 In fact, this introduction of welfare offences was one of the 
biggest steps taken to improve welfare within UK legislation. When introducing the Bill to 
Parliament, it was clarified that the creation of a welfare offence will allow for “enforcement 
agencies to take action if an owner is not taking all reasonable steps even where the animal is 
not currently suffering.”64 This pre-emptive strategy for suffering has proved essential in the 
fight against animal cruelty. So much so that the RSPCA, the leading organisation in this fight, 
reported that in 2018, out of the 1,626 offences they dealt with that fell under the AWA 2006, 
674 of these were related to the s.9 offence of welfare.65 
 
The sections listed above, not only the ones relating to the prevention of physical violence but 
those relating to the promotion of the welfare also, are only as good as the sanctions in place 
for individuals who are found to have breached these provisions. These sanctions are 
predominantly listed towards the end of the Act (s. 32 – s. 34 AWA 2006). The two sanctions 
are divided into two main categories, however, the punishments available are not exclusive of 
each other and can, therefore, be imposed alongside one another.  
 
The first of these punishments would be in the way of imprisonment and/or fine. Both physical 
and welfare offences can constitute a maximum prison sentence of 6 months.66 However, the 
nature of an offence determines the level of fine that can be imposed on an offender, with 
welfare offences having a capped fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.67 It must be 
noted that the wording within the statute states that the maximum sentence available is in fact 
 
63 Ibid s 9 (2) 
64 House of Commons Library: Science and Environment Section, The Animal Welfare Bill (Bill No 58 of 2005-
06)  
65 RSPCA, ‘Prosecutions Annual Report 2018’ (RSPCA UK, 2019) < 
https://www.rspca.org.uk/documents/1494939/7712578/ProsecutionReport2019.pdf/a2ae6cdc-efe2-f6bf-cac3-
0fb53da37bf6?t=1556101041009 > accessed 4 April 2020; Animal Welfare Act 2006, s 9 
66 Animal Welfare Act 2006, s 32 
67 Ibid s 32 (2)(b) 
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51 weeks, however, this should be disregarded and therefore read as 6 months (as stated 
above).68 This is due to the penalties for summary offences being altered by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003.69 
 
The second punishment available is disqualification. Disqualification can prevent the convicted 
individual from: owning animals, keeping (whether wholly or participating) animals, or being 
a party to an arrangement in which they are entitled to control or influence the keeping of 
animals.70 A disqualification order can be granted as a standalone punishment or paired with 
the potential imprisonment or fine(s) listed above. 
 
The AWA 2006 does, in fact, cover large amounts of cruelty offences that can be imposed on 
animals and it is therefore difficult to critique the law for lack of scope. However, it is not the 
protection that the Act provides that is the issue. It is, instead, the sanctions and sentencing 
powers available to the courts when pursuing convictions that fall under this Act. In evaluating 
these powers, further light may be shed on the importance of rectifying the issues we currently 
face. 
 
Critique of the UK Law 
 
As the sentencing powers mentioned above are separated into two main categories, each shall 
be considered in turn, starting first with disqualification orders. 
Disqualification Orders 
 
The power and relevance of disqualification orders being granted by courts can only truly be 
reflected by analysis of the case law surrounding this subject. Unlike other sentencing powers 
(which will be discussed further below), disqualification orders are not flawed by their issuing 
but more so by their enforcement. It is the unfortunate stance that individuals subject to 
disqualification orders are still able to be in close proximity to animals. These eventualities, 
perhaps understandably, occur because it is virtually impossible to monitor an individual’s 
every movement. However, frustration surrounding this matter manifests when an individual 
is apprehended for breaching their disqualification order, and their breach is quashed by the 
 
68 Ibid s 32 (5) 
69 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 281 (5) 
70 Animal Welfare Act 2006, s 34 
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judge hearing their case. This is what occurred in the case of Patterson v Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA).71 
 
The Patterson case was one which could have been a benchmark case in UK animal welfare 
law. However, the judge’s ruling on the matter moved in a different direction and inadvertently 
allowed for less protection to be available for future animals in similar situations. Patterson 
(P) had been subject to a disqualification order which made it a criminal offence for him to 
participate in the keeping of animals, or to be party to an arrangement under which he was 
entitled to control or influence the way they were kept. Despite being subject to this order, the 
RSPCA discovered, upon a future inspection, that P still had numerous animals living with 
him, his wife (C) and their two young children. P attempted to justify this by claiming the title 
of such animals had been passed solely to his wife C, and therefore they were her responsibility 
and not his. Naturally, as it is rather clear that regardless of this title being passed from P to C, 
P was still somewhat participating in the keeping of animals and therefore, in breach of his 
order, the RSPCA applied for the animals to be re-homed.  
 
This re-homing process was never initiated by the owners and upon a third inspection, the 
RSPCA seized the animals. P was consequently charged with breaching his order and aiding 
and abetting animal cruelty offences (offences that P’s wife C was responsible for). Upon 
hearing the case, the judge, in short, deemed that C was in fact guilty of animal welfare 
offences. However, the judge did not deem P to be in breach of his order.  
 
The judge viewed that the order imposed on P was “not so wide as [to prevent] any form of 
contact with a dog or with an animal or control of an animal”.72 In order for a breach to be 
present, the defendant would have to have been “entitled to control or influence the way in 
which they were kept under an arrangement to which [he was] a party”.73 The judge stated that 
although P may be involved in the keeping of the animals, for example when C left the house, 
there was no evidence to show that he was entitled to such care or whether he ever provided 
this care in the past. Furthermore, there was no evidence of P being subject to an arrangement 
between himself and C to provide such care and “the fact that [P’s] presence meant that he was 
 
71 Patterson v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) [2013] EWHC 4531 (Admin) 
72 Ibid, at [26] 
73 Ibid, at [21] 
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able to care in event of a contingency requiring care was not sufficient in itself”.74 Therefore, 
P was not entitled to, or did ever (based on the evidence provided), influence the way the 
animals were kept, leading to no breach of his order. 
 
The Patterson case is perhaps one of the most questionable rulings in relation to the 
enforcement of disqualification orders. It was the non-existence of an arrangement and the 
argument over P’s entitlement that rendered this case a failure. However, in the case 
commentary itself it was stated, and P did not contest the fact, that he “looked after [his] two 
young children when [C] was not there”.75 It seems that the judges in the case omitted to 
address this statement and it is unclear what they thought P did “when the children went to play 
with the animals or the animals “played” with the children.”76 Even from a layperson’s 
perspective, it is clear that P will have participated in the keeping of animals at some point in 
the past and therefore was in breach of his order, regardless of whether this participation was 
subject to an arrangement between the two parties. Its existence shows that not only are 
disqualification orders potentially unenforceable by way of surveillance, but they can even be 
unenforceable within the court. It raises the question to why orders are even in existence 
without the proper enforcement being in place. It seems that the courts, in many cases, are 
inhibiting the expansion of animal welfare by strict interpretation of the Acts available, with 
little attempt to further the common law surrounding this area. Granted it may not have been 
“envisaged that the AWA [2006] would develop its own jurisprudence and… cover many 
hitherto unforeseen eventualities, this [however] should not prevent the Act’s provisions from 
developing.”77 
 
The Patterson case was ruled in favour of humans and in degradation of animals, with true 
speciesism being displayed in the courtroom. However, this is not the only case to do so. A 
case, heard a year previous, was not concerned with the breach of an order, but a claim to 
remove an order altogether. The case of R v Guildford Crown Court78 demonstrated speciesism 
at its finest and was another blow to animal welfare law and its enforcement within the UK. 
The claimant in the case applied by way of judicial review for a declaration as to the court’s 
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discretion when making disqualification orders. The claim arose from prosecution of a traveller 
and horse dealer (B) for offences concerning the ill-treatment of three horses. The 3-year order 
prevented B from: owning animals, keeping, or participating in the keeping of animals and 
being party to an arrangement under which the offender was entitle to control or influence the 
way in which animals were kept. The court allowed the appeal and removed the disqualification 
order from B.  
 
The court even acknowledged that under a natural construction of the law the ban would not 
have been lifted, however, a variation had to be made to B’s concerns that his lifestyle as a 
traveller would be interfered with as he could inadvertently commit a “technical breach” of the 
order.79 Such a variation was made in light of the obligation to read legislation and give effect 
of such legislation in a way which is compatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).80 Determining compatibility with the ECHR, the court felt that disqualification 
from participating in the keeping of animals would have disproportionately affected B’s private 
life. The court deemed this to be necessary as, under Article 8 of the ECHR, “everyone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”, even though 
the court did not directly consider the whole of the Article.81  
 
This partial consideration led to, by some account, an incorrect ruling of the case. Human 
Rights and the legislation bound to these principles are of course of the upmost importance to 
society, however, they should be interpreted in full. Upon further inspection of Article 8 it 
states that a person’s right to respect for his private life is subject to interference for “the 
prevention of disorder and crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.”.82 It is arguable, that lifting the order would lead to further 
animal welfare offences being carried out by the defendant, it was, after all, his entire argument 
that he essentially has to interfere with animals (given his occupation as a horse trader and 
traveller), therefore, likely leading to further disorder and crime. Additionally, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, on the most part, it would be deemed immoral to neglect and harm an animal, so is 
the granting of the disqualification order the protection of morals and if so, is removing this 
ban also removing this protection? This unfortunate ruling and interpretation allows for any 
 
79 Ibid, at [6] 
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person who is in direct contact with animals, and makes a living doing so, potential immunity 
from prosecution in relation to animal welfare crimes. Surely those who are constantly involved 
with animals should be held to higher standards, not provided with a trump card to negate their 
irresponsible and immoral actions. This case was another example of humans favouring their 
own welfare over the welfare of animals. Alongside this it highlighted, once again, the lack of 
enforcement powers the legal system places regarding disqualification orders granted under the 




As with the majority of criminal offences, animal related crimes do carry with them the 
potential for custodial sentences. However, the likelihood of these being granted is very small, 
even for the most graphic of animal related crimes such as causing death and mutilation. This 
reduced likelihood of custodial sentencing has put strain on the judicial system in recent years. 
According to an RSPCA report, which does not count for all of the UK prosecutions, but still 
provides a good base for comparison, it was stated that in 2018 there were 1,626 cases of cruelty 
offences contrary to the AWA 200683, with only 797 of these offences leading to prosecution.84 
However, only 65 of these prosecutions led to an immediate custodial sentence being imposed 
on the offender85, whereas, 159 suspended sentences were issued and 370 community orders.86 
Furthermore, out of the 65 custodial sentences granted, only one was granted for the maximum 
period of 6 months, whereas 43 were issued for between 3 and 6 months and 21 for less than 3 
months.87 This shows that the sentencing powers available to the courts are potentially 
unbalanced and in need of reform. Anger from the public regarding such figures has sometimes 
been directed at the Magistrates responsible for the rulings in these cases. However, this anger 
has been misplaced and the issues surrounding imprisonment need clarifying.88 
 
 
83 RSPCA, ‘Prosecutions Annual Report 2018’ (RSPCA UK, 2019) < 
https://www.rspca.org.uk/documents/1494939/7712578/ProsecutionReport2019.pdf/a2ae6cdc-efe2-f6bf-cac3-
0fb53da37bf6?t=1556101041009 > accessed 6 April 2020 
84 House of Commons Library, Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Bill (Briefing Paper, No. 8612, 2019) 5 
85 Ibid 
86 RSPCA, ‘Prosecutions Annual Report 2018’ (RSPCA UK, 2019) < 
https://www.rspca.org.uk/documents/1494939/7712578/ProsecutionReport2019.pdf/a2ae6cdc-efe2-f6bf-cac3-
0fb53da37bf6?t=1556101041009 > accessed 6 April 2020 
87 House of Commons Library, Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Bill (Briefing Paper, No. 8612, 2019) 5 
88 Alice Collinson and Robert Sardo, ‘Increased Maximum Sentences for Deliberate Animal Abuse: Part of the 
Armoury of the Criminal Justice System in Tackling Violent Crimes Towards People and Animals’ (The UK 
Journal of Animal Law) [2017] ISSN 2516-2225 30 
28 
 
It is true that the Magistrates are mostly in charge of the sentencing of the individuals, however, 
the lack of custodial sentences being granted is not a fault of the magistrates but the maximum 
sentence available to courts for these crimes. 89 Currently, as discussed previously, the 
maximum sentence associated with animal-related offences stands at 6 months. This makes 
granting a custodial sentence extremely difficult. Taking this maximum sentence at face value 
does not portray this struggle, however, when giving any sort of sentence, Magistrates must 
consider aggravating or mitigating circumstances, such as: no previous convictions or a guilty 
plea. After consideration of these factors, a reduction to their sentence is made.  
 
Consequently, a reduction placed on a 6-month custodial sentence normally leads to a non-
custodial sentence.90 An increase of the maximum sentence available in animal related offences 
from 6-months is likely to mean that prison sentences are more likely and potentially longer. 
Not only does an increase of sentence punish those who commit such crimes more severely, 
but it also signals to society that it will not tolerate crimes of violence. This seriousness 
surrounding violent crimes, regardless of whether inflicted on humans or animals, may act as 
a deterrent for future behaviour and potentially reduce animal cruelty cases observed 
throughout the UK. 91 
 
In relation to these increased sentences and the public scrutiny surrounding it, the government 
responded with some action. On 25th June 2019, the government introduced the Animal Welfare 
(Sentencing) Bill 2019, which proposed the maximum sentence for animal related offences be 
increased from 6 months to 5 years.92 Upon first introduction the Bill looked promising, 
however, since introduction the lack of urgency surrounding animal welfare has once again 
been all too apparent. The Bill is currently awaiting a date for the report stage of the hearing 
after passing the Committee stage on 23 July 2019.93 However, this lack of progress in the last 
year  may not be down to a lack of priority in protecting domestic animals in law, but is most 
likely to be as a result of parliament being preoccupied with “Brexit” proceedings.  
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Whilst domestic animals have been specifically referenced, there have been some 
advancements in relation to other animals, particularly animals protected by ‘Finn’s Law’ or 
as the statute reads the Animal Welfare (Service Animals) Act 2019.94 This Act was enacted on 
8th April 2019 and carried with it some amendments to the AWA 2006. The Act expanded the 
definition of what would constitute unnecessary suffering under the AWA 2006, with actions 
against animals, such as police dogs and horses, under the control of officers and being used in 
the course of the officers duties now being deemed as causing unnecessary suffering.95  
 
It would be wrong to state that this development is limited, as any furtherment of the law that 
provides protection for animals is advantageous. It is strange, however, that this law was passed 
so quickly, and we are still awaiting an increase in the maximum sentences available for more 
general animal welfare offences. Especially since, although ‘Finn’s Law’ is enacted, it falls 
under an animal related offence, and therefore, still only carries with it a maximum sentence 
of 6 months. Perhaps the urgency surrounding the development of ‘Finn’s Law’ was as a result 
of further public pressure, with the initial petition leading to the Bill’s first hearing “topping 
100,000 signatures in a month”.96 However, it may be the fact that the animals in question are 
at the service of humans. It feels like, once again, our own intentions (protecting those who 
protect us) are outweighing the overall protection needed. Furthermore, despite planned action 
from the government, the increase in sentence also carries with it further questions; is a 5-year 
custodial sentence, especially for extreme acts of animal cruelty, sufficient for tackling the 
problem? This is where the analysis of sentence lengths becomes more complex. 
 
The issue with analysing sentence lengths arises when considering one of the key factors of the 
legal system, ordinal proportionality. Ordinal proportionality requires that “a penalty should be 
proportionate to the gravity of the offence for which it is imposed”.97 However, for a maximum 
sentence to be deemed ordinally proportionate, comparisons to other offences must be drawn.98 
General comparison would normally involve the following – “The maximum sentence for 
offence X appears too low when compared to the maxima for offences Y and Z”.99 It is 
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beneficial in any comparison to include two comparator offences (Y and Z) as comparison to 
only one offence would make it harder to identify an anomaly in the system (a potentially 
disproportionate X). The issue is that comparisons cannot just be made by randomly selecting 
comparator offences, as these offences also have to be deemed ordinally proportionate for 
comparison to be successful.100  
 
This problem exists as a result of the history relating to maximum sentencing and the reviews 
that have been carried out in relation to this, specifically a review done by the Advisory Council 
in 1978. The review, carried out over a 30-month period, focussed specifically on maximum 
sentences. Within the review, the Council described the maximum sentences as “governed by 
historical accident”, giving specific reference to “the lack of any rational system of maximum 
penalties”.101 The Council reinforced their claims by giving reference to the crime of theft that, 
with the introduction of the Theft Act 1968, faced an increase in maximum sentence from 5 to 
10 years imprisonment. The Council stated that in relation to this, the increase was done so 
without any real reference to “any other branch of criminal law, except aggravated forms of 
theft and related dishonesty offences, and with scarcely any consideration for penal policy.”.102 
This, therefore, backed up their claim of maximum sentences being increased without any sort 
of rational systems in place. This evidence to their claim shows the difficulty in comparing 
sentence length, as not all offences have sentences that are themselves ordinally proportionate.  
 
Furthermore, despite this report by the Council in 1978, alongside the evidence and examples 
provided within the report, there has been no further review or amendment of statutory maxima 
by the government. Therefore, this report provides potential evidence that ordinally 
proportionate comparator offences may not actually exist at all, making the debate for increased 
sentences continuously harder.103  
 
In relation to animal welfare, issues surrounding ordinal proportionality may arise when 
applying the theory of Citizenship, as discussed in Chapter 1, to animals. If it were recognised  
that domesticated animals were to be labelled as ‘citizens’ then “they too [would be] owed full 
protection under the law and… the criminal law [would] be used to reflect and uphold their 
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membership in the community.104 Applying this principle, does this put forward the notion that 
“people who intentionally kill a dog or cat should be subject to the same sorts of penalties as 
the murderers of humans?”105 In assessing whether this proposal is ordinally proportionate, a 
comparator offence has already been provided: murder. However, in order to fully compare 
these two offences, an understanding of the relationship between criminalisation and 
punishment is required.106 The proportionality of an offence lies, in large amounts, with the 
extent in which an individual has “deliberately and flagrantly violated well-established social 
norms”.107  
 
For the offence of murder, it is clear that the maximum punishment available (life 
imprisonment)108 is “proportionate to the gravity of the offence for which it is imposed”, and 
is therefore, ordinally proportionate in its own right.109 However, if the sentencing for the 
equivalent killing of an animal were to be increased to match that of murder, such an increase, 
at current, would not be deemed ordinally proportionate. This is largely because the social 
norms surrounding animal welfare “are not yet well established… [and therefore] the guilty 
party is likely to be less deserving of punishment.”110. However, this does not render the 
statement impossible, as sentencing guidelines “are likely to change over time in light of 
evolving social norms and patterns of socialisation.”111 This means that, if animals are ever 
awarded the label of ‘citizenship’ and their rights and social norms increased thereafter, the 
potential of equal and increased sentencing beyond that of the 5-years proposed may then 
become possible. 
 
Despite these difficult debates, arguments put forward in Parliament can result in positive 
change, regardless if they are deemed as ordinally disproportionate. This scenario occurred in 
2017, when the initial proposal for increased sentencing for animal related offences was 
presented in Parliament. In this proposal, Neil Parish MP stated that “we should consider the 
message that it sends if the sentence for beating to death a sentient being that relies entirely on 
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human care is less than that for, perhaps, stealing a computer, it is really not on.”112 Although 
this argument is logical in a sense, and did put in motion the Bill discussed above, his 
comparison is one that is legally flawed, as he has used, as his comparator offence, an offence 
that, in itself, is not ordinally proportionate: theft.113  
 
The above discussion highlights how complicated making simple legal comparisons can be and 
what factors and considerations are relevant. With such a complicated process, comparison to 
any given sentence is almost impossible, especially in relation to animal welfare offences, 
therefore, maybe an analysis of sentencing needs to be stemmed from another source. Maybe 
it is not the comparison to other crimes that should instigate change in the governments outlook, 
but more so the need for change by way of public interest. 
 
Public Interest and the Need for Change 
 
Changes within the government and the laws that they impose on society have always been 
done so by way of public interest. However, the laws imposed most successfully are ones that 
aim to protect humans rather than animals. The current situation within the legal system and 
the poor sentencing powers available for the courts are leaving animals unprotected in many 
situations. This stance may well carry on, but, if so, and animal abuse goes unchecked, it may 
well lead to a less safe world for humans also, both morally and physically.114 
 
This indication comes from the long-standing recognition that animal cruelty and interpersonal 
violence are linked in some way, however, research surrounding such an area has been rather 
sparse until recent years.115 The research carried out is categorised into three main areas; the 
connection between animal abuse and interpersonal violence (broadly speaking), animal abuse 
and domestic violence and animal abuse and child abuse. These three categories, providing the 
research behind them is conclusive enough, will show the importance of protecting animals in 
order to protect vulnerable humans from violence in the future.  
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Animal Cruelty and Interpersonal Violence 
 
Links between animal cruelty and interpersonal violence throughout history have mainly been 
focussed on extreme acts of violence and high-profile cases. An example of such a case would 
be the actions of Mary Bell, an 11-year-old girl who strangled two children aged 3 and 4, where 
it was later found that she had a previous history of strangling cats and pigeons.116 A further 
case of child violence and animal cruelty was the murder of James Bulger, where one of the 
children responsible for the death of Bulger, Robert Thompson, had a history of the killing and 
mutilation of stray cats and pigeons.117 However, these acts of violence and the links between 
them and cruelty to animals are not just contained to childhood acts. Ian Brady, perhaps one of 
the UK’s most notorious serial murderers, frequently enjoyed “tossing alley cats out of 
apartment windows and watching them splat on the pavement”.118 This rather dramatic 
wording of Brady’s actions shows the sort of commentary that has been used in relation to such 
high profile cases. However, these are not just anomalies in the system. Further studies, on a 
less high-profile level, have been carried out in recent years to reinforce this connection 
between animal violence and interpersonal violence. 
 
One of these was a study by Merz-Perez et al. which focussed on how animal cruelty in 
childhood can relate to violence in later life. The study was a comparison between 45 violent 
offenders and 45 non-violent offenders. It was found that 56% of the violent sample admitted 
to cruelty to animals in childhood, whereas only 20% of the non-violent sample admitted to 
such violence. This is a significantly higher percentage, one which strongly suggests the 
correlation between the two.119 A further study on inmates was carried out by Tallichet et al. 
which took a larger sample of inmates, 261, and investigated their history of animal cruelty. It 
was found that 43% of the male inmates had engaged in some form of animal cruelty with 63% 
of that sample reporting hurting or killing dogs and 55% admitting to abusing cats.120 
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Although these studies do not show a large majority of cases having a connection between 
animal abuse and interpersonal violence, there is still some argument to state that it is in the 
public interest to increase the protection provided to animals. As mentioned previously, an 
increased sentence could potentially act as a deterrent for animal abusers. Coupling this with 
the findings of the studies, which show that 1 in 2 individuals who engage in animal cruelty 
will go on to engage in interpersonal violence, preventing and deterring the early cases of 
animal cruelty could reduce the total amount of violent offences in the future. However, these 
broader figures on violence may not be compelling enough, therefore, some more distinct acts 
of violence will now be provided, alongside their connection to animal cruelty. 
 
The Link Between Animal Abuse and Domestic Violence 
 
Research surrounding this area focussed less on general acts of violence (as discussed above) 
and focussed instead on family-related violence. One of the leading psychologists that have 
been researching this link, Ascione, provided a study that compared how different women had 
reported witnessing animal abuse in their homes. Half of the women sampled were seeking 
refuge at a domestic abuse shelter whereas the other half, which were sourced as a control 
group, were non-abused. Ascione found that the women in the shelters were 11 times more 
likely to report their partners to have hurt or killed a pet (54% reported compared to 5% of the 
non-abused sample). Furthermore, in relation to these findings, the recollection of stronger acts 
of violence towards pets came from victims of severe physical domestic abuse. This shows that 
not only is the presence of abuse linked, but the severity of partner-perpetrated animal cruelty 
may increase as the severity of domestic abuse in the home increases. Ascione also found, in 
the same sample, that the women seeking refuge were 4 times more likely to indicate that their 
partners had threatened a pet (52.5% when compared to 12.5% of the non-abused sample). 
However, in relation to threats this time, it was found that the stronger threats came from the 
partners of those who suffered minor domestic abuse cases.121 This study shows, once again, 
the link between animal cruelty and interpersonal violence but provides an extra layer to the 
findings. Being able to compartmentalise the acts of violence occurring allows for a stronger 
focus on reform. This research shows that the violence will not just occur randomly and in 
public but could occur behind closed doors. This being the case, it makes preventing such 
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violence even more important. It can be seen from this research that introducing a deterrent to 
animal cruelty offences and, therefore, cutting the violence off at the source could reduce the 
cases of domestic violence observed. However, domestic abuse is only one half of family 
violence, there are further links between the presence of animal abuse and child abuse within 
the home. 
 
The Link Between Animal Abuse and Child Abuse 
 
Although interpersonal violence causes detriment to society and domestic abuse should never 
be taken lightly, the most vulnerable human victim discussed in the last three links is, without 
doubt, children. A study by DeVinvey, Dickert and Lockwood analysed 53 pet owning families 
being treated by a state child welfare agency for cases of child abuse. In analysing these 
families, they found that 60% of these households reported both animal and child abuse. Under 
further investigation, it was found that 80% of this sample had reported physical child abuse 
and 34% had suffered sexual abuse or neglect.122 This 60% of abuse is a larger finding than 
that of general interpersonal violence or domestic abuse, but all figures were in the majority. 
This link, and the links previously discussed, demonstrate evidence relating to the link between 




The introduction of increased sentencing for animal abuse, essentially acting as a deterrent, 
will not completely solve interpersonal and family violence. Similarly, the introduction of such 
sentencing will not eradicate all animal abuse cases. However, it may work towards reducing 
the cases observed. Even if such an argument could be seen as subjective, there are certainly 
no negatives to enforcing harsher sentencing.  
 
The following chapter will focus on the UK’s proposed increase in sentencing with a 
comparison to global legal systems. Here, analysis will be made as to whether the proposed 5-
year increase is substantial enough in progressing the fight against animal cruelty. Or should 
more be done by the UK government, perhaps beyond that of sentencing, to increase the 
protection available to animals.  
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Chapter 3: Comparison to International Legal 





The chapters leading up to this point have outlined and explained the need for change within 
the law. This change is not just limited to a philosophical level, but for the overall protection 
and interest of the wider public also. It has already been established that the written law 
available within the UK is broad enough to offer appropriate protection, it just requires the 
correct implementation. Therefore, with the proposed increase in sentencing in the 
Government’s agenda, an analysis of the animal welfare laws available on a global scale is 
necessary. This analysis will allow for assessment of whether the UK is finally on its way to 
providing sound protection to both the animals and humans affected in animal abuse scenarios. 
 
The UK’s proposed 5-year maximum sentence shall be compared to the sentencing available 
to other countries. Further to this, an assessment will be made to whether the UK’s protection 
should solely be limited to an increase in sentencing or, as is the case in other countries, should 
additional measures be introduced to aid and protect animals. These measures can create a more 
coherent legal system for the benefit of both animals and humans. Therefore, an analysis of 
these measures and the potential for implementation within the UK legal system will also be 
provided.  
 
Comparison to International Legal Systems 
 
The consideration of animal welfare laws on a global scale is inevitably a difficult task due to 
the amount of countries that exist, so to allow for varied comparison, specific countries have 
been selected from around the world to compare to the UK system and its proposed changes. 
An overall summary of European sentencing will be provided, including more in-depth 
discussions relating to France and Switzerland, followed by comparison to both the Australian 








Figure 1: Maximum prison sentences for animal cruelty available in Europe 123 
 
Country Maximum prison sentence available Notes 
Austria 1 year Under review to increase 
Belgium 3 months  
Bulgaria 3 years  
Croatia 1 year  
Cyprus 1 year Under review to increase 
Czech Republic 3 years  
Denmark 2 years  
Estonia 1 year  
Finland 4 years  
France 2 years  
Germany 3 years  
Greece 2 years  
Hungary 3 years  
Ireland 5 years  
Italy 3 years  
Latvia 5 years  
Lithuania 1 year  
Macedonia 6 months  
Malta 1 year Planned to raise to 3 years 
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Montenegro 5 years  
Netherlands 3 years  
Norway 3 years  
Poland 2 years  
Portugal 2 years  
Romania 1 year  
Serbia 3 years  
Slovakia 3 years  
Slovenia 1 year  
Spain 18 months Recently increased from 1 year 
Sweden 2 years  
Switzerland 3 years  
Ukraine 2 years  
UK   
England & Wales 6 months Planned to raise to 5 years 
Northern Ireland 5 years Recently increased from 2 years 





Punishment for animal cruelty in the French courts seems to aim more at depleting an 
offender’s financials rather than their liberty. This is because the offences can carry with them 
a large fine of up to €30,000, however, this is only an ‘up to’ figure.124 Therefore, there is no 
guarantee that any prosecution would impose such a large fine. Whilst there is the ‘potential’ 
of a large fine, the French legal system only imposes a maximum sentence of 2 years for animal 
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welfare offences.125 Granted this measure is four times than what is currently observed within 
the UK legal system, but it falls far short of the intended changes proposed by the recent UK 
sentencing Bill.  
 
Therefore, taking only France as an example, it would seem that the UK protections and 
proposed changes are holding up against scrutiny. However, it would seem that France are not 
the most engaged country in the fight against animal cruelty, therefore, outperformance in 
comparison is not that great of an accomplishment. In a report published by the European Court 
of Auditors, it was shown that France had the highest reports of non-compliance with farm 
welfare standards. Depending on the area of agriculture, France reported non-compliance on a 
range of 25% to 65% of all sites inspected, this is compared to the ranges of other countries 




The Swiss legal system is renowned for having great protection for animals. It is granted an 
overall rating level of B by the Animal Protection Index with their laws relating to animal 
protection being awarded an A grade.127 This is because the Swiss legal system acknowledges 
not only the physical welfare of its animals in its laws but their mental health also. This has 
been seen by Switzerland’s response to modern animal behavioural research that shows 
specific animals’ needs for social contact. In response to this research, the Swiss government 
stated, in law, that certain animals that were deemed to be social, such as Guinea Pigs and 
Rabbits, should not be housed alone, as social contact with animals of their own species 
guarantees their emotional wellbeing.128 Further to this, it is not just the emotional wellbeing 
of domestic animals that is important to the Swiss judiciary, but the wellbeing of livestock also. 
Provisions have been written in law stating that calves separated from their mother and kept 
individually should be kept in a location that is in eyesight with animals of the same species, 
in an attempt to reduce the emotional distress caused to the calves during weaning.129 
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Despite Switzerland having these extra measures in place, their sentencing falls short of the 
UK’s proposed 5-year increase. In Swiss law, as in all systems, animals are referred to as 
property.130 Therefore, as there is no separate sentencing guidelines for animal related offences, 
the laws relating to animal cruelty and welfare are sentenced in line with the laws relating to 
criminal damage. With this being said, in Switzerland, any individual who is prosecuted for an 
animal welfare/cruelty related offence could be liable to a monetary penalty or a custodial 
sentence not exceeding three years.131 
 
Once again, at current, the Swiss law carries with it a custodial sentence that is six times 
lengthier than the UK’s current system, at 3 years. However, also similar to France, it falls 
short of the proposed 5-year increase for the UK system. In addition to this, it would seem the 
Swiss system imposes on its offenders either a custodial sentence or a fine, whereas offenders 
within the UK can be dealt both a custodial sentence and a fine. It would seem that, once again, 
the UK’s proposed 5-year increase is outperforming their European associates, but how does 




The laws in Australia and the sentencing available varies depending on the location of an 
offence, as the sentencing guidelines are different throughout the different Australian states 
and territories. Therefore, for the purposes of comparison, a demonstration of the range of 
sentencing available throughout Australia will be provided.  
 
Starting first at the low end of the spectrum, if an offence is carried out and sentenced within 
the ‘Northern Territory’ of Australia, offenders will only be faced with a maximum sentence 
of 1-year imprisonment, or a maximum fine of $13,700 (with this maximum fine relating to a 
‘natural’ person).132 It would seem again, similar to France, that the punishment in the Northern 
Territory is more focussed on financial punishment rather than imprisonment. However, like 
all the countries observed, the maximum within the Northern Territory is still twice as high as 
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what is currently observed within the UK, but also, falls far short of the proposed increase 
within the UK legal system. 
 
This rather minor punishment, however, is only observed within the Northern Territory of 
Australia. The state in Australia with the harshest of sentencing, both in relation to 
imprisonment and fines is the Queensland state. Queensland imposes on offenders a maximum 
prison sentence of 7-years.133 However, this sentence is only available for extreme acts of 
cruelty, for example the killing or causing of serious injury.134 With serious injury being 
defined as “the loss of a distinct part of an organ of the body; or a bodily injury of such a nature 
that, if left untreated would – endanger, or be likely to endanger, life; or cause, or be likely to 
cause, permanent injury to health.”135 Any infliction of harm on an animal that does not fall 
under this definition, that may be described as ‘minor’ carries with it a maximum sentence of 
3-years imprisonment.136 
 
In analysing the sentences available in Queensland, even on a minor level the sentences 
available seem quite solid. The fact that there are two sentencing guidelines available for 
differing severity of animal welfare offences is an attractive prospect and is possibly something 
that the UK legal system would benefit from. This is not only because of the subjective nature 
behind how to classify severity of animal abuse, with a written definition removing such 
ambiguity, but, also, this increased sentencing for extreme acts of cruelty acknowledges the 
public interest argument put forward in Chapter 2 about the risks associated with severe acts 
of animal cruelty and interpersonal violence in the future. Therefore, the Queensland system 
seems to have a comprehensive approach on sentencing and imprisonment. 
 
The sentencing possibilities in relation to fines within Queensland also do a consistent job in 
protecting animal welfare. An interesting point in relation to the available fines is the differing 
fines available to both ‘natural’ and ‘legal’ persons: ‘natural’ persons giving reference to 
individuals and ‘legal’ persons to corporations.  The maximum fine in relation the breach of 
animal welfare provisions for a ‘natural’ person being $235,600 and for a ‘legal’ person 
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$1,178,000.137 This scale of fine has not yet been observed, in any of the countries or territories 
discussed previous and is therefore totally unique to Queensland.  
 
The inconsistencies of sanctions within certain countries and territories has already been 
discussed, stating that they are not always balanced, with most favouring financial punishment 
over that of a custodial sentence. It would seem that Queensland, as a whole, both in relation 
to sentencing and fines, has a successful system in place to tackle breaches of animal welfare. 
Not only do they have differing sentences available for various levels of animal cruelty, but 
differing fines also, with fines holding corporations to a higher standard than individuals, and 
rightly so, but the fines imposed on ‘natural’ persons hardly being in favour of the offender. 
Such large fines and large custodial sentences may act as a deterrent within this territory and 
perhaps provide a good precedent for further development within the UK system. 
 
United States of America (USA)  
 
The United States (US) legal system is one that operates in a similar way to the Australian 
system. Each individual state has their own legal constructions, however, federal laws are also 
in place to provide blanket protection across the entire nation. With 50 states being present 
throughout the USA, it would, similar to Australia, be unsuitable to assess every state law 
relating to animal welfare offences. Therefore, an overall assessment will be made. This will 
be done by focussing on the federal laws available throughout the nation, but also giving 
reference to some particularly robust laws observed in certain states. 
 
The US is a country that has advanced their laws relating to animal welfare offences at a 
surprising pace in the past 20 years, with around 28 of the 41 proposed referenda for the 
improvement of animal welfare measures being passed.138 The most recent development being 
introduced by President Trump towards the end of 2019. This improvement consisted of the 
introduction of a federal offence for animal cruelty related offences, with the creation of the 
Prevention of Animal Cruelty and Torture Act 2019.139 The introduction of a federal offence 
for animal cruelty reinforces the protections that are already observed within the US on a state 
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level and allows for prosecutors to “address cases of animal abuse that cross [several] state 
lines”.140 The PACT 2019 has been described as a “necessary tool” to provide animals with the 
protection they deserve and allow for the “most horrific acts of animal cruelty [to be] 
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law”.141 
 
The construct of the Act refers to the act of “animal crushing” being an offence.142 Although 
this wording may be interpreted on a literal basis, the Act goes on to define what sort of actions 
would constitute as “crushing”. These being any action that results in “one or more living non-
human mammals… [being] purposely crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled or 
otherwise subject to serious bodily injury”.143 Alongside this protection against the act of 
inflicting injury itself, the Act also provides protection against the creation of “animal 
crushing” videos. Once again, this does not just apply to the creation of “video” in its literal 
sense, but is defined further as “any photograph, motion-picture film, video or digital recording, 
or electronic image”, so long as this video “depicts animal crushing and is obscene”.144 
Therefore, the introduction of this federal offence provides wider protection for animals on a 
national level in the US, however, it is not just this wide protection that shows the strength of 
the US legal system, but the sanctions in place for the breach of these provisions. 
 
In comparison to the previous countries and states discussed, the US legal system carries with 
it the largest sentencing potential for breach of its federal provisions. A breach of the Act 
discussed carries with it a maximum term of 7-years imprisonment. In addition, the available 
custodial punishment also benefits from the capability of fines being imposed alongside 
imprisonment, not either/or as observed within the Swiss legal system. That said, the capability 
of fines being imposed alongside custodial sentences is nothing new, with such options also 
being observed within the UK system.145 
 
With the above sentencing guidelines being discussed, it would seem that the UK’s proposed 
increase is good, but not quite perfect. The analysis provides some room for improvement, with 
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such improvements being discussed later, however, maybe the analysis should not be limited 
to a comparison of sentence length. The US legal system and the organisations that work in 
tandem with the system have further protections available, protections that could also be of 




The further protections observed within the US legal system and beyond are sparse, however, 
there are two distinctive features which seem to lead the way in the protection of both animals 
and the wider American public. For the purposes of this dissertation, the two features that will 
be discussed are the presence of an animal abuse register and the concept of cross-reporting, 




The introduction of an animal abuse register within the US legal system was as a result of 
public interest across various states, with three of New York State’s counties being the first to 
act by introducing an Animal Abuser Registry in 2010.146 The counties that initially introduced 
this registry were Albany, Rockland and Suffolk, with the introduction in Suffolk being as a 
result of “71 per cent of battered women say[ing] their pets have been killed or threatened by 
their abusers”.147 The registries availability was then expanded across the remainder of the 
New York State in 2014, with the creation of the Animal Abuse Registration Act.148 The 
introduction of the registry demonstrates the US’s appreciation and acknowledgment of the 
research proposed throughout Chapter 2, that highlighted the public interest aspects associated 
with an increase in the legal protection of animals. This acknowledgement was not just 
observed in a single US State, Tennessee also introduced a register of their own in 2016.149 
 
It must be noted, however, that the abuse registers available across States are not identical and 
for the purposes of providing an example structure of one, an analysis of the New York 
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legislation will be provided. The New York conditions require that any individual, over the age 
of 18, who is convicted of animal abuse in the county is added to the registry for 5-years 
following sentencing or following their release from their custodial term. Further to this, a 
consequential conviction (upon release or after sentencing) of animal related offences can 
extend this period to an additional 10-years’ registration. Finally, failing to register or abide by 
the conditions in relation to the registration can result in a 1-year sentence or a $1,000 fine.150 
It would seem, therefore, that the implementation of a register is not just to provide sanctions 
to those individuals who have already committed animal related offences, but, also, provide 
further, harsher, sanctions on those individuals who continue abusing animals. This is an 
attractive sentencing possibility to enhance the animal welfare standard within the UK and 
provides a further message to the UK public that cruelty to animals will not be taken lightly 
within the legal system. 
 
Currently, the New York system is only available for inspection from certain organisations. 
These organisations are referred to as ‘relevant bodies’ and include law enforcement, pet shops 
and animal shelters. With this being said, this access comes with specific responsibilities. The 
organisations are required to check the register before any transfer of an animal and are 
required, by law, to refuse such a transaction if it is found that the individual in question appears 
on the register.151 However, this selective availability for the register in New York is not 
observed within the State of Tennessee, where the register is available for the full public to 
view.152  
 
The introduction of a register within the UK legal system, is an attractive possibility. It will not 
only act as a deterrent for animal related crimes, but if similar measures are proposed as in the 
New York registers, it would also prevent re-offending in relation to these crimes, as the 
registration period can be doubled as a result of this. Further to the register acting as a deterrent, 
the granting of disqualification orders in relation to animal welfare crimes, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, is a sanction that works well on paper but not so much in practice. The issues 
observed in the previous chapter emphasise the lack of surveillance available to the authorities 
to monitor those individuals who have been subject to disqualification orders. The introduction 







of animal related offences in the past, and who may be subject to disqualification orders, but 
also prevent potential future cruelty of animals by those who are prone to repeat behaviour.  
 
Although, it would seem that the presence of a register would help in the ways mentioned 
above, such assistance comes with various downsides. The first of these issues is surrounding 
the availability of the register in US States, an issue that would have to be considered if such a 
register were introduced within the UK system. The issue put forward is that if the register 
were available for the whole public to view, there would certainly be some queries regarding 
data protection. It is argued by commentators that, with a register similar to that observed in 
Tennessee, presence on the register may amount to some sort of public shaming.153 Public 
shaming which would lead to an individual becoming “further isolated from society”, similar 
to those individuals who are listed on the sex offenders’ registers.154 
 
This aspect of availability is only an issue that would have to be decided if the UK were in the 
process of introducing a register of their own, however, it would seem from past debate that 
this won’t be happening any time soon. In 2016, the UK government stated that it was satisfied 
with the disqualification orders that are currently in place, stating that these are a way to 
“prevent animal abuse, cruelty and poor welfare in the future”.155 We have already seen that 
this is not the case, and the enforceability of such orders may as well be non-existent. The 
government was challenged on this aspect in 2016, but they maintained their previous position.  
 
After their defence to the successfulness of disqualification orders, the government responded 
to the introduction of a register by giving reference to certain privacy issues discussed above. 
It stated that the introduction of a register would not so much shame the individuals on it, as 
put forward above, but could rather “facilitate vigilantism”.156 This is a belief that is not just 
conjured by the government itself, but one that is supported by the police also.157 It is the 
government’s belief, therefore, that the introduction of a register could do more harm than 
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highlight offenders. In their report, the authorities gave reference to the Police National 
Computer, a service that “provides a searchable, single source of locally held operational police 
information”.158 In using this computer, it allows for authorities to “bring together data and 
local intelligence so that every force can see what is known about an individual, including any 
operational information relating to animal cruelty or mistreatment.”159  
 
The issue with this system, however, is not the storing of information, but once again, who is 
entitled to access this information. The current system in place does not allow for animal 
organisations, who are responsible for distributing animals to specific individuals, to access 
this database. Instead, the process states that “if a person has concerns about another individual, 
they can approach the police who can check their records on the Police National Computer. 
The police may then take the most appropriate action.”160 This is problematic because it relies 
on quite a lengthy and formal process to take place. An organisation would have to be 
suspicious of an individual and be confident enough in their suspicions to pursue the matter 
further with the police. It seems unlikely, that animal abusers and offenders are displaying their 
convictions publicly, and therefore, it would be difficult for organisations to decide which 
suspicions are worthy of pursuit, especially since the constant checking of innocent individuals 
may well amount to the wasting of police time.  
 
This process, therefore, undoubtfully, allows for many animal abusers to pass under the radar 
once again, similar to that seen with the enforcement of disqualification orders. A change in 
the system, that allows for specific organisations to search a register for such offenders would 
not allow for this eventuality. Granted, it is of the upmost importance to not allow this register 
to be available to the public, to avoid the shaming and vigilantism listed above. Furthermore, 
it is important that the use of such a register would be done so in compliance with the relevant 
date protection laws. However, it is clear that the correct introduction and use of a register 
could allow for animal cruelty offenders to be monitored more effectively and prevent any 
further abuse to animals by their hand. Monitoring that would not be available to the wider 
public, but specific organisations prescribed by the government and acting alongside the police.  
 
 





Cross-Reporting, Protective Orders and Upward Departures 
 
The existence of an abuse register is not the only measure the US has in place beyond 
sentencing. They also have a concept of cross-reporting. The motivation behind cross-reporting 
stems, once again, from the US’s acknowledgement of the links between animal abuse and 
interpersonal violence (as discussed in Chapter 2). The existence and “development of 
mandated cross-reporting systems for child protection and animal welfare agencies… allow 
animal investigators to refer families to child welfare services and vice versa”.161 Furthermore, 
cross-reporting legislation allows relevant investigators to “refer families with identified child 
maltreatment or animal cruelty for investigation by parallel agencies” for example, “suspected 
adult victims of violence”.162 The introduction of cross-reporting mechanisms, therefore, 
acknowledges all three links highlighted in Chapter 2, ranging from standard interpersonal 
violence to child abuse and domestic violence. 
 
The initial reporting of animal abuse to the differing authorities not only stops the abuse that 
has been experienced first-hand but allows for the authorities to investigate potential further 
abuse that other individuals or animals may be subjected to by a perpetrator. Furthermore, if it 
is found that the abuse spills out to affect others, the US legal system has measures in place to 
provide protection to those who are affected. Victims of domestic abuse cases within the US 
are normally granted protective orders against their abuser, however, these protective orders 
can also be extended to include the animal owned by the victim alongside the victim 
themselves.163 This is an extension that is available in 32 US states as of the start of 2020.164 
These orders are, especially with the existence of the register that runs within US states, adding 
to the protection of both the victims themselves (both animal and human) and the risk of re-
offending in the future. 
 
In addition, the deterrent factor that is imposed on individuals in relation to animal welfare 
offences is furthered once more with the existence of ‘upward departures’ in the US legal 
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system. These are measures that are in place that allow for heightened sentencing available to 
individuals who carry out specific animal welfare offences under certain circumstances. These 
circumstances include where “there is a previous conviction of domestic violence; the animal 
abuse occurred in front of a child; or the abuse was carried out so as to threaten another 
person.”165 This further measure, once again, increases the protection available to animals. 
With the introduction of this third, and final measure, the US legal system is not just 
acknowledging the link between animal abuse and domestic violence, an acknowledgement 
which is not observed within the UK legal system, but the US system also demonstrates that 




The analysis provided within this chapter has shown that the UK’s proposed increase in 
sentencing stands up to scrutiny when compared with their European neighbours, however, 
further afield legal systems offer protection beyond that of sentencing which seem beneficial. 
The further measures observed within the Australian and the US system provide for potential 
to expand UK measures to a new-found level. These measures not only acknowledge the 
need for protection of animals, but also the links between animal and interpersonal violence 
outlined within Chapter 2. This progression, if implemented, will allow for further protection 
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Although the philosophy behind animal welfare may not be directly linked to legal innovation, 
the discussions put forward act as a foundation of thought. One that should be considered by 
each and every individual. Thoughts that not just further the government’s action on animal 
welfare, but ones that further all of the moral duties owed to another.  
 
It is clear that the past has not been kind to animals, but it seems like change is on the horizon. 
However, it is the responsibility of humans to ensure that this change is demanded, 
implemented, and enforced. Such change may be noticed in the welfare societies or the 
advocates that act on behalf of them, but the ultimate change must be observed within the 
English legal system. A system that, up until now, considerably limits the protection it affords 
to animals of all sorts. Protection that is not necessarily limited by statute, but by the sentencing 
powers available to the courts in relation to these statutes. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the protection of animals can be improved merely beyond the 
increase in sentencing, such as the introductions of systems akin to those within the US legal 
system. Upon evaluation, we have shown how these systems favour animals more so than that 
observed within the UK system. The particulars discussed have not been reserved to that of 
sentencing but also the sanctions in place to protect the wider public as well as the animals 
directly affected. This wider application has shed further light on the lack of protections 
available within the UK legal system and reinforced the arguments put forward. It is in the 
public interest, regardless of how you view the sentiency or importance of animals or their 
citizenship, to increase the sanctions and protections that are granted to animals by law.  
 
Currently, the 5-year proposed increase for maximum sentencing within the UK seems to stand 
up to scrutiny, especially with comparison to their closest European neighbours. However, 
potential improvements in the law are observed when compared to the Australian system and 
their split offence sentencing. Further to this, the US legal system not only contains a higher 
available sentence, on a federal level, but the further measures available to authorities extend 
beyond that of the UK. These measures are partly as a result of the US government 
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acknowledging the crucial links between interpersonal and animal violence and imposing such 
protections to reflect this link. 166 
 
Therefore, the UK system requires change to be as protective and consistent with their 
international counterparts. It is suggested, firstly, there should be an introduction of split 
sentencing guidelines, enshrined in law, that relates to the severity of animal abuse cases. This 
introduction would allow for clarity within the law as what constitutes ‘serious harm’ and ‘less 
than serious harm’ thereby eliminating the apparent subjectivity in UK courts today. Further to 
this, it would allow for harsher punishment to those who commit the more disturbing crimes 
against animals, as these types of offences have been observed to lead to human-human 
violence later in life (as seen in Chapter 2). Furthermore, although the 5-year maximum 
sentence falls short of the US equivalent, it may still be substantial enough, especially after 
comparison to the European legal systems. However, if two separate sentencing guidelines 
were adapted, it is suggested that a 7-year maximum on the crimes that constitute ‘serious 
harm’ be imposed and allow for the 5-year maximum to be available for all other offences.  
 
Secondly, comparisons to the US system revealed that the UK system is deficient in protections 
outside of imprisonment. The introduction of an animal abuse register, for all relevant 
authorities, similar to that seen in New York, would be of great benefit to the legal system as a 
whole. The existence of a register allows for disqualification orders to be properly executed, as 
individuals subject to such orders, or past offenders in general, will no longer be able to obtain 
animals from the relevant establishments. Further to this, as we have seen with the 
Government’s response to a register, the current system relies on the police to enforce and 
investigate those who may be a risk to an animal’s welfare. The introduction of the register 
will allow for this burden to be passed to the organisations leading the fight against such abuse 
and reduce the strain on the emergency services.  
 
Finally, the theory of ‘upward departures’ being directly written into law, giving specific 
reference to animal abuse, child abuse and domestic violence, may contribute towards 
protecting those who are perhaps the most vulnerable in society. Granted, the theory of ‘upward 
departures’ is already prevalent within the legal system, especially sentencing, when 





animal-related offences eliminates the risk of judges being subjective in their rulings and may 
ensure the protection required is granted.  
 
These changes within the UK legal system may seem small, but with the correct 
implementation would evoke much-needed change. Change that would not just be observed in 
the fight against animal cruelty but one that would further protect all individuals who rely on 
the legal system for their overall welfare and safety. The improvement of animal welfare 
standards will increase the nobility of the UK as a whole, along with its legal system, as “the 
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